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“I am unaware of any support in the
American constitutional tradition . . . for
the proposition that a defendant can avail
himself of the panoply of appellate and
collateral procedures and then complain
when his execution is delayed.”1

ing death row prisoners, penological goal implications, and international trends regarding the delays between sentencing and
death. Part III amalgamates the opinions of Justices Thomas and
Stevens in light of this analysis and presents a new, practicable
solution to the issue of delay on death row.

BACKGROUND
INTRODUCTION

A

s recently as March 2009, the Supreme Court has
expressed a divergence of opinion as to whether
the long delays endured by a death row prisoner
awaiting execution violate the Eighth Amendment of the Constitution.2 Not only does a death row inmate
ultimately suffer the punishment
of execution, he or she also endures a lengthy prison sentence
in an isolated, restrictive environment possibly best characterized
as “austere.”3 Indeed, at the time
of the Eighth Amendment’s enactment in 1789, it is unlikely that
the Framers considered the period
between sentencing and execution
as a punishment itself,4 as this generally lasted only days or weeks.5
However, it seems prudent to reevaluate the notion that the confinement period before execution
does not constitute cruel and unusual punishment when we consider that the waiting period in 2000 approached twelve years.6
Rather than viewing the entire capital punishment system as
flawed in light of this conclusion — which it is not — we must
be willing to investigate the concept of “delay as punishment”
on a case-by-case basis in light of the Eighth Amendment.7 The
purpose of this article is to explore a hybrid stance that reconciles Justice Stevens’ and Thomas’ conflicting opinions in
Thompson v. McNeil.8 Part I provides the basis for each Justice’s
opinion concerning Thompson9 in greater detail and examines
related Supreme Court cases. Part II explores the issues related
to prolonged delays on death row including conditions affect4

The Eighth Amendment of the Constitution provides
protections to ensure that no “cruel and unusual punishment”
will be inflicted upon citizens of the United States.10 Since the
Eighth Amendment’s inception, capital punishment has been a
permissible penalty for the most heinous of crimes.11 As early
as 1890, in In re Medley, the Supreme Court recognized that
“one of the most horrible feelings . . . is the uncertainty” felt
by the prisoner between sentencing
and execution.12 Remarkably, this
statement refers to a case in which
a prisoner spent only four weeks
awaiting execution,13 a timeframe
unheard of in today’s legal system.
Now, over one century later,
prisoners serving terms in excess
of fifteen, twenty, and thirty years
have petitioned the Supreme Court
to challenge their sentences based
on the Eighth Amendment.14 However, the response of the Supreme
Court is to deny these petitions
15
for writ of certiorari. Each case has conveyed a clear divergence of opinion regarding the applicability of such claims to
the Eighth Amendment, thus indicating that this issue deserves
further debate and deliberation. Further, it is persuasive that recent trends in international jurisprudence signify an aversion to
lengthy terms on death row.16 In fact, some international cases
have gone so far as to call delays of as few as five years prior
to execution “lengthy sentences” constituting “cruel, inhumane
and degrading treatment.”17

Spring 2011

I. A BRIEF SUMMARY OF SUPREME COURT
JURISPRUDENCE CONCERNING THE DELAY BETWEEN
SENTENCING AND EXECUTION
In Lackey v. Texas, Justice Stevens expressed that despite
the importance and novelty of the petitioner’s Eighth Amendment challenge considering the seventeen years he had already
served on death row, the issue was not yet ripe for a Supreme
Court opinion.18 One explanation for Justice Stevens’ opinion
in Lackey may be that the Court often uses denial as a tactic to
enable lower courts to act as laboratories before addressing an
issue itself.19 Interestingly, nearly two decades prior to Lackey
the Court supported capital punishment in light of the Eighth
Amendment largely because it believed the death penalty served
the social purposes of retribution and deterrence.20
However, one of Justice Stevens’ main aversions to carrying out the death penalty after such great delays was that the
prisoner had already received a severe punishment, thus satisfying the penological goal of retribution.21 Merely sitting on death
row for such lengths of time is in itself a mentally taxing punishment. In addition to the arguable satisfaction of retribution, the
added deterrent effect of execution after a lengthy incarceration
period “seems minimal.”22 Hence, by Stevens’ logic, the minor
returns of actually carrying out the execution after such delay
would be cruel and unusual punishment and violative of the
Eighth Amendment.23
In the fourteen years that passed between Lackey and
Thompson, the Supreme Court never granted certiorari on the
issue of whether long delays on death row violate the Eighth
Amendment.24 Despite this, Justice Stevens’ opinion in Thompson was that the issue deserved the attention of the Supreme
Court.25 He asserted that the combination of delayed execution
with the extreme conditions of death row and the psychological tolls inflicted on a prisoner as his death sentences are removed, then reimposed while he makes his way through the
legal system is arguably cruel and unusual.26 Stevens went so
far as to suggest that given the delays in carrying out executions, the death penalty system in the United States was currently “unworkabl[e].”27
Conversely, Justice Thomas staunchly supported the notion that prisoners would not suffer overly lengthy sentences
on death row but for their purposeful availment to procedure.28
Hence, these delays, which are the unavoidable result of procedure, should not provide justification for a new Eighth Amendment right,29 as this would give death row inmates grounds to
nullify execution simply by creating further procedural delays.
Therefore, despite the lack of constitutional tradition regarding
lengthy death row sentences,30 Thomas contended that because
the prisoner had control over his or her own fate, allowing an
Eighth Amendment challenge to prevail would make a mockery
of our current justice system.31 “Consistency,” Justice Thomas
Criminal Law Brief

suggested, “would seem to demand that those who accept our
death penalty jurisprudence as a given also accept the length
of delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary
consequence.”32

II. CONDITIONS ON DEATH ROW AND INTERNATIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
The situation of death row prisoners is bleak. According
to studies, many such prisoners find themselves in cramped
cells with little opportunity to exercise or interact with others.33
Moreover, most prisons only permit this class of inmate to be
outside their cells for less than three hours per day.34
While at first glance this may seem like the only practical
method for confining our arguably most dangerous prisoners,
this is not always the case. Some prisons have experimented
with allowing death row inmates to participate in work programs and/or desegregating them from the general population.35
Desegregation has proven to provide positive results benefitting
both the prisoner and the overall prison system.36 Further, the
expectation that death row inmates will assault other prisoners
because they have “nothing to lose” appears to be unfounded.37
However, the conditions on death row often create a sense
of despair in prisoners. There is clear evidence that most of
these prisoners lack the requisite educational skills to defend
themselves in the appeals process without assistance.38 This disparity may lead to a sense of hopelessness, which has evolved
in recent years into a new “condition” known as “death row
syndrome.”39 This phenomenon is a relatively novel legal concept that traces back to the European Court of Human Rights.40
Indeed, international jurists have used death row syndrome as a
basis for several decisions in human rights and capital punishment cases. Although these jurists have used varying definitions
of the condition, all seem to oppose lengthy prison sentences
prior to execution.41 Probably the most notable example occurred in Soering v. United Kingdom, where the United Kingdom denied the extradition of a potential capital punishment
prisoner due to the conditions of Virginia’s legal and penitentiary system.42 While international opinion should certainly not
be binding upon United States courts, such opinion should be
considered as persuasive evidence as to what the global community believes is a fair policy.
Credit for inception of the term “death row syndrome” as it
applies to American legal consciousness stems from the Michael
Ross case, in which the prisoner “volunteered” for execution.43
Ross’ willingness to volunteer for death perplexed some people
and they claimed that he suffered from death row syndrome,44
an issue that had never reached a court prior to Ross’ execution.
However, presently this phenomenon has yet to be truly studied
and thus remains unsubstantiated.45 Yet the significance of the
death row syndrome and its creation as it pertains to the Eighth
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Amendment is an indication of a clear and developing social
aversion to long delays prior to execution.

III. A KINDER AND MORE “USUAL” PUNISHMENT
Justices Stevens and Thomas differ in their opinions as to
whether a lengthy delay from sentencing to execution is worthy
of consideration in light of the Eighth Amendment.46 Considering this divergence within the Supreme Court and the changes
in the past century affecting the landscape of capital punishment, the time has arrived to address this matter.47 There are
many issues to take into account when evaluating the death
penalty. One such issue is the great weight of mental anguish
suffered by the inmate with regards to
the uncertainty of his or her execution.48
Undeniably, the conditions endured by
most death row prisoners during their
wait for execution are the most severe
and isolating our prison system has to
offer.49 Thus, as stated above, prison
administrators should explore other
options to improve confinement conditions and decrease costs. While the Supreme Court may not have the expertise
to commandeer death row programs
effectively,50 the pure possibility that a
death sentence may convert into a life
sentence may exert the needed pressure
for altering the conditions on death row.
Justice Thomas makes the logical
point that prisoners should not complain or attempt to have their sentence
mitigated to life imprisonment through the Eighth Amendment
when the delay is of their own design.51 This assertion, however,
is perhaps far too ambiguous to apply to all prisoners. Instead,
as suggested by Justice Stevens, “[i]t may be appropriate to distinguish . . . among delays resulting from (a) a petitioner’s abuse
of the judicial system by escape or repetitive, frivolous filings;
(b) a petitioner’s legitimate exercise of his right to review; and
(c) negligence or deliberate action by the State.”52
In cases where (a) applies, the prisoner is at fault and therefore should not be able to access any remedy under the protections of the Eighth Amendment. However, in cases where (b)
and/or (c) apply, the Court should selectively grant certiorari
on a case-by-case basis. The circumstances considered by the
Court should include the fault of the state, the speed at which
the prisoner exhausted all his judiciary avenues, the length of
the prisoner’s sentence term, prison conditions, and fault of the
defendant’s legal representation.
Both Justice Stevens and Thomas agree that some amount
of delay between sentencing and execution is inevitable.53 Because this inevitable delay is a necessary precursor to carrying

out an execution, this delay should be excluded from judicial
consideration. However, the court should construe the Eighth
Amendment to impose a duty upon the government to mitigate
undue delays in the procedural process, as failure to do so is a
failure of the system and not the prisoner.54

CONCLUSION
When the delay between sentencing and execution transforms from days and weeks to more than a decade, this surely
changes the landscape of capital punishment jurisprudence in
light of the Eighth Amendment. If the
Supreme Court does not consider cases
in which this occurs, it tacitly approves
of two punishments being served for
one crime. The first punishment, time
on death row, is arguably more severe
than the execution that awaits the prisoner. When the length of that sentence
is significantly longer than necessary to
allow for appeals and other procedure,
the court should make a determination
as to whether the state failed to carry
out the execution in a humane manner
and, if so, accordingly commute a prisoner’s sentence to life in prison. Failure
to impose an affirmative duty upon the
government to alleviate undue delays
in the judicial process as it pertains to
carrying out executions has equivalence
to placing death row prisoners under an invisible cloak under
which the Eighth Amendment does not reach.

Because this inevitable
delay is a necessary

precursor to carrying
out an execution,

this delay should be

excluded from judicial
consideration.
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Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 990 (1999) (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari).
2
Compare Thompson v. McNeil, 129 S. Ct. 1299, 1299 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (“[S]ubstantially delayed
executions arguably violate the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition against
cruel and unusual punishment.”) with id. at 1301 (Thomas, J., concurring
in denial of certiorari) (“[T]he issue . . . is whether the death-row inmate’s
litigation strategy, which delays his execution, provides a justification for
the Court to invent a new Eighth Amendment right. It does not.”).
3
Mark D. Cunningham & Mark P. Vigen, Death Row Inmate Characteristics, Adjustment, and Confinement: A Critical Review of the Literature, 20 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 191, 204 (2002) (summarizing research studies
on death row inmates’ living conditions) (quoting George Lombardi et al.,
Mainstreaming Death-Sentenced Inmates: The Missouri Experience and
its Legal Significance, 61 FED. PROBATION 3, 3 (1997)).
4
See Lackey v. Texas, 514 U.S. 1045, 1045 (1994) (discussing the
Framers’ practice in the year of the Eighth Amendment’s enactment,
1789).
1
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See Amy Smith, Not “Waiving” But Drowning: The Anatomy of Death
Row Syndrome and Volunteering for Execution, 17 B.U. PUB. INT. L.J. 237,
248 (2008) (explaining that in the United States, the expected wait time
between conviction and execution a century ago was typically only a matter of days or weeks, whereas in the year 2000 it stood at 11.42 years).
6
See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 3, at 195 (summarizing research studies on death row living conditions).
7
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII (”Excessive bail shall not be required,
nor excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishments inflicted.”).
8
Supra note 2.
9
Id.
10
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
11
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of petition
for writ of certiorari).
12
134 U.S. 160, 172 (1890); accord. Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
13
See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045-46 (stating that uncertainty in a delay
period of four weeks logically applies with greater force to a delay period
of many years).
14
See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (reviewing a case where there was
a delay of thirty-three years); see also Foster v. Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 991
(2002) (dismissing a request for certiorari where the defendant waited
for twenty-seven years, although the national average between sentence
and death was eleven years); Knight v. Florida, 528 U.S. 990, 992 (1999);
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (1995).
15
See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1299; Foster, 537 U.S. at 990; Knight,
528 U.S. at 990; Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045.
16
See, e.g., Soering v. U.K., 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) 439, 475-76
(1989) (acknowledging that some delay in the American justice system
was necessary, but further expressing its abhorrence of the long amount
of time the prisoner served in conjunction with a death penalty sentence
still hanging over his head); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 239 (citing
authority and cases from the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council,
the United Nations Human Rights Committee, and the Supreme Court of
Canada).
17
Pratt v. Att’y Gen. for Jam., [1994] 2 A.C. 1 (Jam. 1933) (appeal
taken from Jam.).
18
See Lackey 514 U.S. at 1045 (discussing that due to the novelty and
importance of the question presented, the Supreme Court deferred from
review until the issue has been addressed by other courts); cf. Foster v.
Florida, 537 U.S. 990, 990 (2002) (emphasizing that the denial of a petition for a writ of certiorari does not constitute a ruling on the merits).
19
See Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047 (noting the Supreme Court’s practice
of declining to immediately rule on a novel issue and choosing instead to
observe lower courts for further study on the matter).
20
See id. at 1045 (discussing how the Framers considered the death
penalty a permissible punishment) (citing Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153,
183 (1976)).
21
See id. at 1045, 1046-47 (noting the prisoner’s seventeen years already spent on death row).
22
See id.at 1046 (comparing the deterrent value of an actual, immediate
execution to the deterrent value of seventeen years on death row).
23
See id. (citation omitted); see also Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1046-47
(1995) (citing Riley v. Att’y Gen of Jam, [1983] 1 A.C. 719, 734 (Jan.
1983)). Justice Stevens’ opinion that lengthy sentences on death row arguably constitute cruel and unusual punishment also finds support from
English jurists’ opinions over Section 10 of the English Bill of Rights
1689. This bill of rights is the precursor of the United States Eighth
Amendment and should be considered when interpreting its original intent.
24
Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1299.
5
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See id. (reiterating Justice Stevens’ opinion in Baze v. Rees, 553 U.S.
35, 81 (2008), that the “‘time for a dispassionate, impartial comparison of
the enormous costs that death penalty litigation imposes on society with
the benefits that it produces has surely arrived’.”).
26
See id. at 1299-1300 (pointing out a plethora of issues facing this specific case, including the severe conditions of death row in a six-by-nine
foot cell combined with twenty-three hours of daily isolation, a multitude
of errors made throughout the trial process including bad advice from
counsel, and the stay of his death penalty warrant on two occasions only
shortly before his scheduled execution).
27
Id. at 1300.
28
See id. at 1301 (2009) (reiterating his concurring opinion in Knight,
528 U.S. at 990, where “‘[he is] unaware of any support in the American constitutional tradition or . . . precedent for the proposition that a
defendant can avail himself to a panoply of . . . procedures and then
complain when his execution is delayed’.”); see also Foster, 537 U.S. at
991 (implying that prisoners could end their anxieties and uncertainties
simply by “submitting to what people . . . have deemed [them] to deserve:
execution.”); Knight, 528 U.S. at 992 (“It is incongruous to arm capital
defendants with an arsenal of ‘constitutional’ claims with which they may
delay their executions, and simultaneously to complain when executions
are inevitably delayed.”).
29
Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (2009) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d
924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment).
30
See Knight, 528 U.S. at 991-92 (agreeing in part with Justice Breyer’s
opinion that there is nothing in our constitutional tradition that justifies
the lengthy delays between conviction and sentence).
31
Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301 (2009) (quoting Turner v. Jabe, 58 F.3d
924, 933 (4th Cir. 1995)) (Luttig, J., concurring in judgment).
32
Knight, 528 U.S. at 992.
33
See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 3, at 204-05 (2002) (detailing
the death row policies regarding accommodations).
34
See id. at 204 (stating that eighteen jurisdictions allow death row prisoners less than an hour outside each day).
35
Id. at 205.
36
See id. (other benefits included cost savings, more efficient staff utilization, improved prisoner access to legal materials and assistance, and
increased recreational activities).
37
See id. at 203 (suggesting that many death row inmates do not exhibit
serious violence within institutional confinement; many of these prisoners
have incentives for good behavior).
38
See id., at 199-200, 206 (discussing that a significant minority of
death row inmates qualify as mentally retarded while typical intelligence
rates range in the average to low average IQ range; further, two studies
covering death row inmates showed the average school attendance fell
into the ninth grade level and educational achievement ability was at the
fifth grade level).
39
See Harold I. Schwartz, Death Row Syndrome and Demoralization:
Psychiatric Means to Social Policy Ends, 33 J. AM. ACAD. PSYCHIATRY &
L. 153, 154-55 (2005) (analyzing how the severe conditions of death row
can alter inmates’ mental status to the point where actual execution seems
preferable).
40
See Avi Salzman, Killer’s Fate May Rest on New Legal Concept, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 1, 2005, at B6 (describing briefly the case of Jens Soering, a
man accused of murder in Virginia who fled to the United Kingdom, then
challenged extradition based upon the length of time and deplorable living conditions of Virginia’s death row).
41
See Pratt, 2 A.C. at 2 (stating that capital punishment sentences
in excess of five years provide strong grounds for arguing inhuman or
degrading punishment); see also Smith, supra note 5, at 239-40 (summarizing the opinions of various international bodies that have determined
that long delays between sentencing and execution constitute inhuman or
25
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degrading punishment; the article further defines the death row phenomenon as follows: “[M]ost definitions of ‘death row phenomenon’ have
included at least two components . . . [those being] a temporal requirement (length of time) and a physical one (harsh conditions).” Neither
component by itself is sufficient to constitute the phenomenon. Instead, a
third and integral requirement included in many definitions addresses the
experiential component or psychological effects of living under a death
sentence).
42
See Soering, 11 Eur. Ct. H.R. at 460, 478 (discussing the Privy Council’s decision, which primarily focused on the length of delay and the
conditions the prisoner might face while awaiting execution if he received
a death sentence in the United States. The court concluded that the conditions constituted inhuman and degrading punishment).
43
See Smith, supra note 5, at 242 (explaining that Ross, who had purportedly attempted suicide on three separate occasions while on death
row, repeatedly tried to waive his mandated appeals to volunteer for execution).
44
See Schwartz, supra note 39, at 153-55 (discussing the Ross case,
where an experienced psychiatrist examined Michael Ross, a convicted
killer, and deemed him to be without an active major psychiatric illness
(besides sexual sadism) at the time that he volunteered to waive any further procedure. Ross, in spite of personal opposition to the death penalty,
indicated that he wished to waive his state and federally mandated appeals
to “volunteer” for execution).
45
See id. at 154 (noting that the death row phenomenon is quite possibly a social policy claiming its foundation in psychiatry, as it remains an
invalidated diagnosis).
46
Supra note 2.
47
See Smith, supra note 5, at 241-43 (discussing developments such as
California’s abolition of the death penalty and the emergence of death row
phenomenon in the United States).
48
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1045 (citing In re Medley, 134 U.S. at 172).
49
See Cunningham & Vigen, supra note 3, at 204 (detailing death row
prisoners’ living conditions. In many jurisdictions, inmates are housed in
individual cells, allowed less than an hour activity outside, and social visitation is no-contact).
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See Thompson, 129 S. Ct. at 1301-02 (discussing the disastrous consequences of the Supreme Court’s recent foray into prison management).
51
Knight, 528 U.S. at 990-92.
52
Lackey, 514 U.S. at 1047.
53
Compare id. (creating a formula for determining when a delay should
not count against a prisoner and when his Eighth Amendment rights have
been violated) with Knight, 528 U.S. at 460 (stating that consistency demands those “who accept our death penalty jurisprudence . . . as a given
also accept the lengthy delay between sentencing and execution as a necessary consequence.”).
54
See Pratt, 2 A.C. at 18-19 (analyzing a section of the Jamaican constitution analogous to the Eighth Amendment and implying that the government’s responsibility is to ensure that executions occur expeditiously).
50
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